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1. Introduction
Electronic markets are becoming increasingly transpar-
ent with low search cost, strong price competition, and low
margins. Automated negotiation enables a business to go
beyond price competition. Through the use of autonomous
agents, which negotiate on behalf of their owners, a busi-
ness can obtain ﬂexibility in prices and goods, distinguish
between groups of buyers based on their preferences, and
even personalize complex goods according to the demands
of individual buyers without signiﬁcantly increasing trans-
action costs.
We focus here on one-to-many bargaining, where a seller
agent negotiates, on behave of a seller, with many buyer
agents individually in a bilateral fashion. In many cases,
auctions can be used to effectively organize one-to-many
bargaining. For various situations, however, auctions may
not be the preferred protocol for bargainers. In situations of,
for example, ﬂexible or virtually unlimited supply, multiple
issues, and/or continuous sale the appropriate auction pro-
tocol becomes, at best, much more complex. Consequently,
businesses may opt for the intuitive and ﬂexible bilateral
bargaining protocol, where the seller agent negotiates bilat-
erally with one or more buyers simultaneously by exchang-
ing offers and counter offers.
Only little work has been done to study actual strategies
for one-to-many bargaining. For the case of virtually unlim-
ited supply, as for information goods, we present a number
of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller. These
strategies take into account a “fairness” norm whereby buy-
ers are treated in a similar fashion. Preventing unfair out-
comes is important for maintaining customer satisfaction,
which in turn may be important for a business’ long-term
proﬁtability. We compare the performance of the bargain-
ing strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially
for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed
strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus given suf-
ﬁcient time pressure; they utilize the fact that the setting is
one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral.
2. Bargaining protocol
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents si-
multaneously by alternating proposals and counter propos-
als. A proposal just states the price for which a bargainer
is willing to buy/sell the good, although it can easily be ex-
tended to include multiple issues, e.g. see [1, 2]. The bar-
gaining protocol also allows for bargainers to set a delay
before responding to a proposal.
3. One-to-many bargaining strategies
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the
seller that maximize overall revenue by utilizing differences
in buyers’ willingness to pay indirectly through their time
impatience. The strategies as developed also take into ac-
count a notion of fairness: the seller should be indifferent
between offers made to different buyers within a reasonable
time interval.
The developed seller strategies determine a threshold
level which sets the price for new offers and the minimal
priceforacceptingbuyeroffers.Weconsiderﬁxedthreshold
strategies, time-dependent threshold strategies, and respon-
sive threshold strategies. The ﬁrst type of strategy is intro-
duced for comparison and is unable to utilize a buyer’s time
pressure. In case of the second type, on the other hand, the
threshold is changed from one period to the next, allowing
for indirect price discrimination based on the buyers’ time
impatience. The responsive threshold strategy is inspired by
the ﬁrst-price auction. With this strategy, the threshold is set
to the highest offer that is submitted within a certain time
interval. Unlike the previous strategies, this strategy does
not rely on (a-priori) knowledge of buyer preferences. It
may become vulnerable, however, whenever groups of buy-
ers experience very little time pressure. To prevent very low
prices in case of little or no time pressure, we also introduce
combined strategies with either a ﬁxed or time-dependent
reservation value (i.e., minimum price level).
In order to beneﬁt from time pressure all the seller strate-
gies introduce a (ﬁxed) delay before responding in case an
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old, on the other hand, a seller responds without delay.
4. Simulation and results
We apply an evolutionary simulation environment as
in [1] to evaluate the performance and robustness of the
above negotiation strategies against many learning buyers
in case of ﬂexible (or unlimited) supply. The strategy pa-
rameters, i.e. a value in case of a (combined) ﬁxed thresh-
old or a piece-wise linear function in case of a (combined)
time-based threshold, are learned using an evolutionary al-
gorithm (EA). EAs are a class of search algorithms based
on Darwin’s theory of variation and natural selection, and
are increasingly being used for modeling economic behav-
ior. The strategies of each buyer agent type (see below) and
the seller agent evolve in a separate EA population to al-
low heterogeneity of their behavior. Note that the respon-
sive threshold strategy (without reservation value) does not
require any learning by the seller agent.
4.1. Buyers and their agents
A buyer in the simulation is interested in at most one
unit of the offered good in each bargaining game. We con-
sider the case where buyers are impatient and prefer an
early agreement. Time pressure is a common assumption in
bargaining. The seller agent is simultaneously and contin-
uously negotiating with many buyers and is therefore less
concerned with immediately reaching an agreement for a
particular bargaining game. Buyers can have different pref-
erences regarding their time pressure and valuation of the
good, which together characterize the buyer type.F o rt h e
simulation we have 3 types. The number of buyer agents in
a negotiation of each type is randomly determined for each
game by a Poisson distribution with average λ =1 0 .
A buyer agent of type i tries to maximize the utility
ui =( vi − p)δt
i with valuation vi of the good, price p,
discount factor δi and period t. Negotiations move to the
next period whenever the seller agent applies a delay be-
fore responding. We assume that, because of the time pres-
sure, buyer agents respond without delay. Buyer agents use
a time-dependent threshold strategy as described in Sec-
tion 3 with an adaptive piece-wise linear function.
4.2. Results
The results measure the fraction of the seller’s surplus,
i.e., the seller’s total proﬁt as a fraction of the maximum ob-
tainable proﬁt, after a learning process of 500 generations of
the EA, with 200 negotiations per generation. Each negoti-
ation takes up to 40 periods. Results are averaged over the
last 1000 negotiations and 30 experiments. Figure 1 shows
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Figure 1. Fraction of seller surplus for differ-
ent seller threshold strategies: (1) ﬁxed, (2)
time-dependent, (3) responsive, (4) combined
(3) and (1), and (5) combined (3) and (2).
the results for various buyer discount factors δ (where δ is
equal for all buyers) and seller threshold strategies.
As shown in Fig. 1, the ﬁxed threshold strategy (1) is
able to extract around 65% of the surplus. The time-based
threshold strategy (2), however, can obtain higher proﬁts by
utilizing the buyers’ time pressure. Buyers with a high valu-
ationwillpurchaserelativelyearly,sincewaitingforabetter
deal does not compensate the loss due to time discounting.
Note that with no time discounting (i.e., when δ =1 .0)t h e
ﬁxed threshold strategy performs better because of the dif-
ference in strategy complexity: a single value is more easily
learned than a piece-wise linear function.
Outcomes using the responsive threshold strategies (3),
(4) and (5) show an impressive increase in the fraction of
surplus when buyers are impatient. For sufﬁciently high
time pressure, the seller obtains almost all surplus, indicat-
ing that buyers submit and/or accept offers close to their
reservation value. Note that this is achieved while respect-
ing our notion of fairness. The results also show superior
performance of the combined responsive strategies if buy-
ers have very little time pressure. This makes the combined
strategies very versatile.
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